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INTRODUCTION
Led by a President with a well-documented disregard for truth,' it
is not surprising that the Trump administration has adopted a variety
of mischievous information policies. The word policies might suggest a
more cohesive and intentional approach than actually exists in the
* Callejo Endowed Professor, Gerald J. Ford Research Fellow, Associate Dean for Research, SMU
Dedman School of Law. I thank Ren~e Landers and David Thaw for their thoughtful comments
and suggestions, as well as other participants at the Chicago-Kent College of Law symposium, The
Trump Administration and Administrative Law. I also thank for individual comments and sugges-
tions Anthony Colangelo, Bill Buzbee, James Coleman, Bill Funk, Chris Jenks, Ron Levin, Jonathan
Masur, Joel Mintz, Dick Pierce, Bijal Shah, Peter Shane, and Peter Strauss.
1. This sentence feels bizarre to even write. And yet, see Glenn Kessler et al., President
Trump has made 4,713false or misleading claims in 592 days, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/politics/2018/09/04/president-trump-has-made-false-or-
misleadingclaims-days/ [https://perma.cc/SQSY-L49W]. The data is based on analysis by The
Fact Checker project at the Washington Post. The Fact Checker, initiated in 2007 and situated at
the Poynter Institute of Media Studies in St. Petersburg, Florida, is a signatory of the International
Fact-Checking Network code of principles, which includes commitments to non-partisanship,
transparency of sources, transparency of funding sources, transparency of methodology, and a
commitment to making open and honest corrections.
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current White House. But the Trump administration has taken sporad-
ic actions, many unrelated to each other, that together signal a shift
away from open government-or at least away from information poli-
cies based on neutral principles-towards more cynical uses of gov-
ernment information. Examples include removing certain data from
the public domain, manipulating data, censoring scientists at various
federal departments, scrubbing certain terms and topics from federal
web sites, and using transparency initiatives as a pretext to undermine
sound science.2 This article attempts to tease out an emerging "infor-
mation policy" for the Trump administration, explain how it departs
from the information policies set by predecessors, and evaluate the
extent to which legal and nonlegal mechanisms can constrain or oth-
erwise deter abuses of executive discretion.
I. INFORMATION POLICY
"Information policy" reflects the countless decisions that the Pres-
ident and federal agencies make in deciding how-and indeed wheth-
er-to generate, collect, publish, and present information.3 Although
some of these decisions are governed by statute,4 the federal executive
generally enjoys wide discretion. These discretionary decisions some-
times are governed by written policies, guidelines, or manuals adopted
by individual agencies, or by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) or its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).5 We
can thus study federal "information policy" by referring to these docu-
ments. But "information policy" also exists in discretionary decisions
not governed by statute or by internal agency rules. How agencies ex-
ercise their discretion, how they effectuate their internal rules, and
how they interpret statutory directives is worth closer examination.
Of course, describing an "information policy" for the vast execu-
tive can be daunting. The federal "executive establishment" includes
the Executive Office of the President and its ten components, as well as
fifteen executive or "cabinet" departments (which themselves include
2. See infra Part lL.
3. The U.S. Code includes a subchapter titled "Federal Information Policy," and one stated
purpose is to "ensure the greatest possible public benefit from and maximize the utility of infor-
mation created, collected, maintained, used, shared and disseminated by or for the Federal Gov-
ernment." 44 U.S.C. § 3501(2) (2012). Indeed, Title 44 of the U.S. Code deals with "Public Printing
and Documents." Of course, "information policy" as practiced by the government exceeds the
scope of activities addressed in Title 44, and thus the analysis here is broader as well.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Parts II, IV.
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several significant sub-agencies) and eighty-one independent agencies
that together employ around 2.85 million civilians.6 To say there is a
single, coherent "information policy" in the executive obviously over-
simplifies.
Moreover, it can be hard to generalize about "information policy"
given the sheer volume and variety of information released by the fed-
eral executive. The executive publishes information in almost every
possible way, from traditional press releases written by traditional
press offices, to sprawling web sites with thousands of unique pages, to
social media posts, and virtually everything in between. In fact, the
executive's informational function is so vast that the OMB now in-
cludes an Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer (OFCIO),7 and
many federal agencies have their own Chief Information Officers
(CIOs).8 Thus, describing how federal agencies and their staff dissemi-
nate information-in all its forms-may be a bit presumptuous.
Nevertheless, because information practices can vary considera-
bly from administration to administration,9 departures from prior ad-
ministrations can signal important shifts in information policy. Thus,
we can study the "information policy" of each administration by re-
viewing executive orders, centralized instructions from the OMB and
OIRA, and other changes in policy articulated in writing. We also can, of
course, observe each administration in practice. This Article tries to do
both.
Information policy is worth examination because the volume and
variety of data generated by the federal government grows hourly.
Moreover, as the methods for disseminating that data have proliferat-
ed,10 the federal executive enjoys even more opportunities to influence
what information the public receives and how. Information policy is
6. DAVID E. LEwis & JENNIFER L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES,
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6, 11 n.24, 12 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/
publication/sourcebook-united-states-executive-agencies [https://perma.cc/2TYK-GRDW].
7. See Office of the Fed. Chief Info. Officer, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Welcome, CIO.GOV,
https://policy.cio.gov [https://perma-cc/XE3X-NFBH].
8. See CIO Council: Leadership & Membership, CIO.Gov, https://www.cio.gov/about/
members-and-leadership/ [https://permacc/6RGD-SQFV]. The federal Council of Chief Infor-
mation Officers was established by Executive Order 13011, and then was codified by the E-
Government Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-347, 116 Stat 2899 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code). The Council is an "interagency forum for improving agency practices
related to the design, acquisition, development, modernization, use, sharing, and performance of
Federal information resources." About the Council, CIO.Gov, https://www.cio.gov/about/
[https://perma.cc/9EKM-JAHY].
9. See infra Parts II, II1.
10. See Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era,
2011 B.Y.U. L REV. 1371, 1392 (2011).
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also important because the public tends to trust federal sources of in-
formation."1 Facts and data published by agencies carry the imprima-
tur of the federal government.12 Thus, government efforts to hide,
manipulate, or engage in other information mischief can be particular-
ly pernicious. Facts and data are, of course, prerequisites to sound pol-
icyrnaking. Even when facts are in dispute, our system of government
depends on a willingness to engage with facts, data, and "truths" about
the world.13 Thus, information policy critically examines how the fed-
eral executive generates, disseminates, presents, and controls infor-
mation.
Viewed in broader context, for much of our nation's history, citi-
zens have pushed the federal government to be more transparent-to
adopt a more open information policy.14 Government disclosure is seen
as a virtue across the political spectrum because it appeals "to so many
of our intuitions about how government, markets, and regulation
should work."15 Transparency is seen a precondition for government
accountability.16 Today, government transparency sits comfortably
"among the pantheon of great political virtues."17 But the relative
transparency we enjoy now was both hard-won and achieved only
gradually, via four separate movements. As I have explained in previ-
ous work:
The 1930s brought efforts to publish so-called "secret laws" gener-
ated by agencies during the New Deal. The 1940s brought the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act's mandates to give regulated parties
advanced notice of agency actions. The 1960s and 1970s introduced
FOIA and the era of transparency by request And the 1990s and
2000s introduced mandates for agencies to post information on the
11. NATHAN CORTEZ, AGENCY PUBLICITY IN THE INTERNET ERA 94 (2015).
12. Id.; Nathan Cortez, Regulation by Database, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 79 (2018).
13. See Leah Litman & Helen Klein Murillo, Information Wars Part 1: The Challenge to the
Census, TAKE CARE (Apr. 13, 2017), https://takecareblog.comblog/information-wars-part-i-the-
challenge-to-the-census [https://perma.cc/9CN3-V3C3].
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3 (requiring each chamber of Congress to "keep a Journal
of its Proceedings, and from time to time to publish the same," which may have been a deliberate
departure from the practices of the British Parliament); James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the
Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1218 (2010); Cortez, Regula-
tion by Database, supra note 12, at 10-20 (tracking the history of open government and transpar-
ency laws).
15. Cortez, Regulation by Database, supra note 12, at 21.
16. Id at 27-28.
17. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IowA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006).
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Internet, establishing important agency norms of online publica-
tion.l 8
Today, of course, information policy is tied inextricably to agency
use of web sites and other modern media, through which agencies
post voluminous information about their decisions and activities.19 As
agency use of web sites became the norm, Congress enacted laws
calling for even more online disclosure, such as the Electronic
Freedom of Information Act of 1996 (e-FOIA),20 the Information
Quality Act of 2001,21 the E-Government Act of 2002,22 and the Open
Government Act of 2007.23 Part IV examines the extent to which
these laws constrain executive discretion, particularly the recent
information "mischief' of the Trump administration.
More normatively, when considering an optimal information poli-
cy for the federal executive, I suggest there is a meaningful distinction
between information and messaging-that is, between information
that purports to be truthful and objective, and messaging that we
expect to be more subjective.24 Of course, many communications are
hybrids-a stew of opinion and fact together, or opinions based on
facts, or opinions presented as facts. Differentiating the two can be
difficult, although I maintain it remains worthwhile when trying to
articulate potential constraints on often unbounded executive discre-
tion.
A recent case illustrates the difficulty. In 2017, the Sierra Club
asked the EPA's Inspector General to investigate remarks made by
then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt expressing doubt that human ac-
tivity contributed to climate change.25 The Sierra Club alleged that
18. Cortez, Regulation by Database, supra note 12, at 10-11. For a wonderful evaluation of
FOIA on its 50th anniversary, see TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018).
19. Peter L Strauss, Implications of the Internet for Quasi-Legislative Instruments of Regula-
tion, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 377, 377-78 (2010); James O'Reilly, Libels on Government
Websites: Exploring Remedies for Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L REv. 507, 508 (2003).
20. Pub. L No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)).
21. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L No.
106-554, § 515, 114 Stat 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001); 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2012). This law is some-
times referred to as the "Data Quality Act."
22. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat 2899 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
23. Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552).
24. CORTEZ, supra note 11, at 7.
25. U.S. EPA Sci. INTEGRITY PROGRAM, DETERMINATION REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF A LoSs OF
SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY CONCERNING REMARKS BY ADMINISTRATOR PRUITT (2017), https://
2019]
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Pruitt violated the EPA's own scientific integrity policy, which ensures
that EPA officials adhere to principles of scientific integrity "in the use,
conduct, and communication of science."26 Pruitt was asked during a
television interview:
Do you believe it's been proven that carbon dioxide is the primary con-
trol knob for climate?
Pruitt responded:
No. I think that measuring with precision human activity on the cli-
mate is something very challenging to do, and there's tremendous dis-
agreement about the degree of impact So no, I would not agree that
it's a primary contributor to the global warming that we see.2 7
Although the statement appears to contradict scientific consensus
on climate change, the EPA's Scientific Integrity Review Panel deter-
mined that his statement qualified as mere opinion and was not made
in a "decisional context."28 The panel found that the EPA's policy ex-
plicitly protects differing opinions, and "is designed to encourage [an
employee] to express his or her opinion if he or she disagrees with the
scientific data, scientific interpretations, or scientific conclusions that
will be relied upon for said Agency decision." 29
Although Pruitt's statements may be objectionable-factually,
normatively, and ethically-this distinction between messaging and
information, between fact and opinion, is crucial for creating an opti-
mal, workable information policy for the executive. This very crude
matrix offers some key distinctions:
Messaging Information
Fact or opinion? Presumed subjective Presumed objective
Both permissive andStatutory authority? Largely Permissive I mandatory
www.eenews.net/assets/2017/08/02/documentLpm-O4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RB3-NT6K]
[hereinafter EPA SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY DETERMINATION].
26. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2014-02/documents/scientific-integrity-policy_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7CBP-YYWP] [hereinafter EPA SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY].
27. EPA SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY DETERMINATION, supra note 25, at 2.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. (internal quotations of the EPA's Scientific Integrity Policy omitted).
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Information policy, then, should properly focus on information ra-
ther than messaging-on facts rather than opinions. Information that
purports to be objective and truthful should endeavor to be both. It is
not to say that false or manipulative messaging from the executive is
not problematic; rather, there is less legal basis for objecting to it, it is
more tolerated traditionally, and it is less problematic for democratic
ideals where the "marketplace of ideas" operates, at least in theory.
Some federal information policies already reflect this distinction.
For example, OMB guidelines implementing the Information Quality
Act define "information" as "any communication or representation of
knowledge such as facts or data, in any medium or form."30 In contrast,
the OMB's guidelines do not reach "opinions, where the agency's
presentation makes it clear that what is being offered is someone's
opinion rather than fact or the agency's views."31
Of course, if we do focus so-called "information policy" on infor-
mation rather than messaging, can we develop a reliable epistemology
for government information? What is the nature of government infor-
mation? Is it possible to achieve true neutrality? Can the government
ever release purely factual information, and would the release ever
convey pure information without reflecting at least subtle policy or
ideological biases? The question arises, for example, in the context of
Internet search engines: can search engines ever be neutral and not
biased?32 Although the debate is a fascinating one, and probably worth
examining in future work, I do not attempt to answer it here.
Given the proper focus of information policy, then, how have the
last two administrations fared? First, I describe the Obama administra-
tion's approach to information policy. Then, I evaluate how the Trump
administration has retreated from prior policies based on relatively
neutral, pre-established principles, exercising its discretion in more
unpredictable and cynical ways.
30. 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8460 (Feb. 22, 2002).
31. 67 Fed. Reg. 369, 377 (Jan. 3, 2002).
32. See, eqg., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission: Access, Fairness, and
Accountability In the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1149 (2008) (pushing for regulation to-
ward less biased search engines). But see James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search
Neutrality, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435 (Berin Szoka &
Adam Marcus eds., 2010) (critiquing the ideal of search neutrality). For a broader consideration
of algorithmic decisionmaking see Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1 (2018).
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II. OPEN GOVERNMENT UNDER OBAMA
President Obama came to office with a relatively well-formed in-
formation policy. On his first day in office, the Obama administration
published an Open Government Memorandum calling for agencies to
"take prompt steps to expand access to information by making it avail-
able online in open formats."33 Within forty-five days, each agency was
directed to "identify and publish online in an open format at least three
high-value data sets... on Data.gov," and within sixty days, create a
dedicated "Open Government" web page.34 By the end of his admin-
istration, there were nearly 200,000 data sets published on Data.gov
from 166 different agencies.35
Also on his first day in office, the Obama administration published
a FOIA Memorandum directing agencies to "adopt a presumption in
favor of disclosure," emphasizing that, "[i]n the face of doubt, openness
prevails."36 The memorandum continues:
The Government should not keep information confidential merely
because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because
errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or
abstract fears. Nondisclosure should never be based on an effort to
protect the personal interests of Government officials at the expense
of those they are supposed to serve.37
In 2011, in response to the memorandum, the Justice Department
created FOIA.gov to publicize how individual agencies are handling
FOIA requests, with a searchable database showing the number of re-
quests made to each agency and the current backlog.38 Although both
the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations pushed online trans-
parency initiatives, these two Obama memoranda were seen as a sym-
bolic turn from the secrecy of the Bush administration.39 Still,
comparisons with the Bush administration were not always favorable,
33. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Transparency and
Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
34. Id.
35. Cortez, Regulation by Database, supra note 12, at 4 n.3.
36. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
37. Id.
38. Office of Info. Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, What is FOIA?, FOIA.Gov, http://www.foia.gov
[http://perma.cc/VL6C-WLNF].




particularly in responding to FOIA requests, which became a black eye
for the Obama administration's record on transparency. 40
Separately, within months of taking office, the Obama administra-
tion published a Scientific Integrity Memorandum, directing executive
agencies to adopt scientific integrity policies.41 In particular, the mem-
orandum called for agencies to make scientific data publicly available:
Political officials should not suppress or alter scientific or technolog-
ical findings and conclusions. If scientific and technological infor-
mation is developed and used by the Federal Government, it should
ordinarily be made available to the public. To the extent permitted
by law, there should be transparency in the preparation, identifica-
tion, and use of scientific and technological information in policy-
making.42
The memorandum called for agency policies to focus on four sub-
jects: (i) agency culture; (ii) public communications; (iii) peer review
and the use of advisory committees; and (iv) professional develop-
ment43 For example, the EPA's scientific integrity policy prohibits EPA
staff from "impeding the timely release of scientific findings and con-
clusions" and bars EPA officials "from intimidating or coercing scien-
tists to alter scientific data, findings, or professional opinions."44
Likewise, the policy calls for the EPA's public communications arm to
40. The Obama Administration "set a record again for censoring government files or out-
right denying access to them" under FOIA. See Ted Bridis, Obama administration sets new record
for withholding FOIA requests, PBS: NEwsHOUR (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
nation/obama-administration-sets-new-record-withholding-foia-requests [https://perma.cc/
K619-FW22] (noting that the backlog of FOIA requests had grown by 55% in fiscal year 2014, to
more than 200,000 outstanding requests by year's end); Julie Moos, Obama administration's FOIA
record worse than Bush's, POYNTER (Sept 28, 2012), https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/
2012/obama-administrations-fola-record-worse-than-bushs/ [https://perma.cc/N94-MRRZ].
Moreover, the Obama administration was criticized for not being sufficiently transparent in
matters of national security. See, e.g., Jeff Kahn, Terrorist Watchllsts, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
SURVEILLANCE LAw (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017); Conor Friedersdorf, The
Obama Administration's Abject Failure on Transparency, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/02/the-obama-administrations-abject-
failure-on-transparency/252387/ [https://perma.cc/V6XC-7H8S].
41. Office of the Press Sec., Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies re: Scientific Integrity, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 9, 2009), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads-executive-departnents-
and-agencies-3-9-09 [https://perma.cc/9WMR-TZDB] [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum re:
Scientific Integrity]; Kei Koizumi & Jerry Sheehan, Scientific Integrity Policies: An Update,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 19, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.govflog/2016/12/19/
scientific-integrity-policies-update [https://perma.cc/HB3B-P8RU].
42. Presidential Memorandum re: Scientific Integrity, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. EPA SCIENTIFIC INTEGRIrY POLICY, supra note 26, at 4-5; Office of the Scd. Advisor, U.S.




"ensur[e] that scientific research and results are presented openly and
with integrity."45
Thus, from the outset, the Obama administration adopted open
government policies based on neutral principles that would result in
even inconvenient data being published. Notwithstanding the Obama
administration's poor record responding to FOIA requests, written
policies are pre-commitment devices against which later practices can
be measured. (Indeed, the Obama administration was critiqued for not
living up to its written proclamations on FOIA.) Moreover, the memo-
randa published very early in the Obama administration led to sites
like Data.gov and FOIA.gov that, together, collect and publish vast
amounts of information possessed by federal agencies. Even if the
Obama administration was not perfectly transparent46-something
that may be neither wise nor possible47-it made important strides
toward a more open government.
III. INFORMATION MISCHIEF UNDER TRUMP
The Obama administration entered with relatively well-formed in-
formation policies. The Trump administration did not. The Obama ad-
ministration entered by sending a message to federal agencies that
"[s]unlight is the best disinfectant."48 The Trump administration en-
tered with a blackout of sorts. When the Trump administration's in-
formation mischief first came to light, it was criticized for undermining
"the public's ability to hold the federal government accountable," akin
to using "Harry Potter's cloak of invisibility to cover the entire admin-
istration."49 For example, in February 2017, the Trump administration
45. EPA SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY, supro note 26, at 5.
46. See, e.g., Jason Leopold, It Took a FOIA Lawsuit to Uncover How the Obama Administration
Killed FOIA Reform, VICE NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016), https://news.vice.com/en-us/article/7xamnz/it-
took-a-foia-lawsuit-to-uncover-how-the-obama-administration-killed-foia-reform [https://
perma.cc/3Q7P-2695]. The Freedom of the Press Foundation sued the Department of Justice
under FOIA to obtain documents showing that the Obama administration had undermined FOIA
reform bills that had passed both houses unanimously in 2014 (H.R. 1211, the FOIA Over-sight
and Implementation Act of 2014, and S. 2520, the FOIA Improvement Act of 2014). VICE
News then obtained separate documents showing that the FTC and SEC "also tried to disrupt
Congress's FOIA reform efforts, which would have required those agencies to be far more trans-
parent when responding to records requests.' Id. In particular, the records show how significant
the Justice Department's opposition to FOIA reforms was under President Obama.
47. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOwA L REv. 885 (2006).
48. Memorandum For the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies re: Freedom of
Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).




shuttered the site Open.gov created by the Obama administration and
removed all data sets published by the administration on
Open.WhiteHouse.gov.s0 As of late 2018, the former still no longer ex-
ists, and the latter redirects to a meek site titled "Disclosures," display-
ing only a form that executive branch personnel should use to make
required financial disclosures.51 The site Data.gov remains online,
though the number of data sets available fluctuates without much ex-
planation.52 Moreover, President Trump held only one press confer-
ence his first year in office.53 Key White House web sites such as the
OMB site were missing at launch.54
Obviously, incoming administrations change policies from their
predecessors and take care to articulate their new policies through
official channels. But no administration starts from scratch. Each inher-
its from its predecessor a vast, complex federal infrastructure for col-
lecting and disseminating information.55 In this spirit, scholars have
called for the federal agencies to take more seriously their role as data
"stewards," which requires agencies to think carefully about how they
gather, process, and publish information.56 The executive apparatus in
sidelined/2017/05/14/3ae22c28-3106-11e7-8674-437ddb6e813estory.htnl [https://
perma.cc/5PNL-GUZ4].
50. Terrence O'Brien, Trump's quiet war on data begins, ENGADGET (Mar. 20, 2017), https://
www.engadget com/2017/03/20/trumps-quiet-war-on-data-begins [https://perma.cc/5M6T-
9PM2].
51. 2018 Financial Disclosures, WHITEHoUSE.Gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/disclosures/
[https://perma.cc/G9FD-48ZX].
52. At the end of the Obama administration, the site claimed roughly 195,000 data sets. But
on May 3, 2017, it claimed only 155,998 data sets, with no clear explanation why. See Data Cata-
log, DATA.GOV, https://catalog.data.gov/dataset [http://perma.cc/A9ZZ-PTVT ] (listing 155,999
data sets). See also Eilperin, supra note 49. Later reports suggest the difference was how Data.gov
itself tallied the number of data sets. See Danny Vinik, What happened to Trump's war on data?,
POLITICO (June 25, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/07/25/what-happened-
trump-war-data-000481 [https://perma.cc/9484-CYPK].
53. Jessica Estepa, Trump held only one press conference this year. His predecessors had way
more, USA TODAY (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/22/
trump-held-only-one-press-conference-year-his-predecessors-had-way-more/976675001/
[https://perma.cc/8VUZ-QZST]; Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project Presidential
News Conferences, U.C. SANTA BARBARA, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/
presidential-news-conferences [https://perma.cc/E7E2-MT88].
54. Andrea Peterson, White House Office of Management and Budget missing from Trump
WhiteHouse.gov, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2017/01/26/
want-information-about-the-office-of-management-and-budget-you-wont-findit-on-thenew-
whitehouse-gov/ [https://perma.cc/5SLZ-RPFL].
55. Helen Klien Murillo & Leah Litman, Information Wars Part iIl: Climate Changing the
Facts, TAKE CARE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/information-wars-part-iii-
climate-changing-the-facts [https://perma.cc/S3U6-RQP9].
56. Kristin Madison, Legal and Policy Issues in Measuring and Improving Quality, in ThE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAw 680 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016); Cortez, Regulation by
Database, supra note 12, at 70.
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many ways has built-in systems for disseminating both messaging and
information.
Although the Trump administration did not completely undo
these systems, it used the systems in more cynical, mischievous ways.
There are many ways a new administration can undermine open data
policy. First, the administration can simply not collect data to begin
with, which can be accomplished through executive orders or legal
mandates that reverse open government directives, or via budget re-
quests that undermine data collection and publication efforts.57 For
example, the journal Science lamented that the Trump administration's
2018 budget request represented "a grim budget day for U.S. science"
due to major cuts to research funding.ss Revoking funds for research
that generate data effectively strangles information in its crib.s9 The
federal gag order that prevents federal agencies like the CDC from con-
ducting gun violence research-something that predated the Trump
administration-demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach.60
But the Trump administration engaged in a variety of other types
of information mischief, including removing online data, manipulating
data, censoring science, scrubbing web sites of key information, and
using "transparency" as pretext to achieve other ends.
A. Removing Data
In 2017, the Trump administration began removing from agency
web sites records of enforcement actions taken by various agencies,
including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the EPA.61 Some re-
movals were justified as moving away from the "naming and shaming"
57. The Information Wars series on the Take Care blog notes that the Trump administration
refused to add LGBTQ questions to the census and to HHS surveys. See Litman & Murillo, supra
note 13.
58. Sci. News Staff, A grim budget day for U.S. science: analysis and reaction to Trump's plan,
SC. MAG. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/grim-budget-day-us-
sclence-analysis-and-reaction-trumps-plan [https://perma.cc/29R9-M6CU].
59. For example, the Trump administration's 2018 budget request would have slashed the
EPA's budget by 30 percent. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, America First A Budget Blueprint to
Make America Great Again (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/features/FY2018-Budget-
Blueprint [https://perma.cc/ZP23-LBXB]; Sci. News Staff, supra note 58.
60. See Department of Health and Human Services Appropriation Act of 1997, Pub. L No.
104-208, 110 stat. 3009-244 (Sept 30, 1996); Leah Litman & Helen Klein Murillo, Information
Wars Part IV: Doing Violence To Sensible Policy on Guns, TAKE CARE (Apr. 19, 2017), https://
takecareblog.com/blog/information-wars-part-iv-doing-violence-to-sensible-policy-on-guns
[https://perma.cc/9KT7-EZQ3].
61. Eilperin, supra note 49.
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used by previous administrations to pressure regulated firms into
compliance.62 Others were given no justification.
Federal agencies publish voluminous enforcement data on their
web sites.63 The rationale in many cases follows Jeremy Bentham's
logic that "the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave."64
Publishing enforcement and compliance data can help counter "agency
slack,"65 or general under-enforcement by regulatory agencies. 66 Publi-
cation also can encourage more optimal rates of regulatory compli-
ance.67 In fact, some scholars have called for publication of more
centralized and comprehensive enforcement data. David Vladeck sug-
gests Congress should require the OMB to publish a searchable data-
base of enforcement actions across federal agencies to allow the public
to "track repeat-offender corporations."68 Already, more narrow (but
still ambitious) efforts in this vein include the Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University, which publishes
enforcement data obtained via FOIA requests from a variety of agen-
cies,69 and the FTC's Consumer Sentinel Network, a database of over 20
million enforcement records, though the latter is non-public.70
Rather than follow these trends, the Trump administration has re-
treated. First, under the Trump administration, OSHA has stopped pub-
licizing its enforcement actions against companies. Under previous
administrations, OSHA issued a news release whenever sanctions for
workplace health or safety violations reached $40,000 or more.71 Alt-
hough OSHA under the Trump administration had issued more than
200 such citations as of May 2017, it had issued only two such news
62. Id. For an account of these practices, see Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Adminis-
trative Agencies, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1380, 1382-1416 (1973); Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Adminis-
trative Agencies in the Internet Era, supra note 10, at 1371; CORTEZ, supra note 11, at 8-9.
63. Cortez, Regulation by Database, supra note 12, at 24.
64. JEREMY BENTHAM, FARMING DEFENDED (1796), reprinted in 1 WRITINGS ON THE POOR LAWS
276, 277 (Michael Quinn ed., 2001).
65. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement The Case for Expand-
ing the Role ofAdministrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 110 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate
and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 453,473-74 (2011).
67. Cortez, Regulation by Database, supra note 12, at 25.
68. David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal
Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1830-31 (2008).
69. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, About Us, SYRACUSE U., http://trac.syr.edu/
aboutTRACgeneral.html [https://perma.cc/82ZJ-VF2S].
70. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Consumer Sentinel Network, FTC.GOV, https://www.ftc.gov/
consumer-sentinel-network [https://perma.cc/8EAN-49PQ].
71. Eilperin, supra note 49.
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releases.72 The underlying enforcement records are still available on
the Labor Department's web site, but they fail "to constantly alert and
catch employers' attention."73
Second, a few weeks into the Trump administration, the USDA ab-
ruptly "removed public access to tens of thousands of reports" docu-
menting inspections and potential violations of the Animal Welfare
Act,74 including inspection reports, facility reports, regulatory corre-
spondence, lists of regulated entities, and enforcement records.75 The
USDA explained that it revoked public access "based on our commit-
ment to ... maintaining the privacy rights of individuals."76 Congress
itself flagged the USDA's removal of data in a March 2018 report, not-
ing that "heavily redacted inspection reports ... make it difficult in
certain cases for the public to understand the subject of the inspection,
assess USDA's subsequent actions, and to evaluate the effectiveness of
its enforcement"77 The congressional report directed the USDA to re-
store the data, noting that its removal had violated previous directions
from Congress.78
Ten days after the records were removed, the USDA was sued by
PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) and other animal
rights' groups, arguing that removing the documents violated FOIA,
particularly its electronic reading room provisions.79 While the case
was pending, the USDA reposted the majority of documents previously
posted online, except for certain regulatory correspondence and en-
forcement letters that were nevertheless available on other govern-
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Howard Mavity, a lawyer who represents management in OSHA matters but
critiqued OSHA's new policy of not publicizing enforcement actions).
74. Meredith Wadman, USDA blacks out animal welfare information, Sc. MAG. (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/20 17/02/usda-blacks-out-animal-welfare-information
[https://perma.cc/SR7K-7X62].
75. Web Integrity Project, SUNLIGHT FOUND., https://sunlightfoundation.com/tracldng-u-s-
government-data-removed-from-the-internet-during-the-trump-administration/ [http://
perma.cc/HEU9-Q2PH]; Meredith Wadman, Courts Ponder How Public Animal Reports Must Be,
356 SCIENCE 790, 790 (2017).
76. Web Integrity Project, supra note 75. See also Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Animal Welfare Enforcement Actions (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/
aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/sa ac.enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/23AQ-A7FV].
77. Web Integrity Project, supra note 75; H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 115TH CONG., DIVISION
A-AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2018: CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES 4 (2018), https://docs.house.gov/
billsthisweek/20180319/DV%20A%20AG%20SOM%20FY18%200MN.OCR.pdf [http://
perma.cc/T9FB-EHPN].
78. H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 115TH CONG., supra note 77.




ment web sites, and records involving ongoing adjudications that had
not yet been finalized.B0 The D.C. District Court thus dismissed the
complaint as moot, rejecting PETA's claim that the USDA's action was
capable of repetition yet evading review because the USDA claimed it
was removing records temporarily to redact personal information.81
The court found that "[g]iven the temporary, one-time nature of the
Department's removal of records, it is reasonably certain that the De-
partment will not remove these records again."82 The USDA may have
been sensitive about the privacy implications of posting enforcement
records online due to prior litigation.a3 Nevertheless, information on
research facilities has been re-posted by the USDA.84
Third, observers also reported that the Trump administration re-
moved from the EPA and Interior Department web sites various scien-
tific information about climate change.85 Likewise, within a week of
taking office, the Trump administration removed a site called the Fed-
eral Supplier Greenhouse Gas Management Scorecard that ranked ma-
jor federal suppliers' carbon output and whether they had goals to cut
it.86 The site was seen as creating "a powerful incentive for private
companies to improve their environmental practices."87 That lever has
been removed.
Finally, observers have been troubled that the Trump administra-
tion has shielded from public scrutiny various records that might shine
a light on potential conflicts of interest in the White House. For exam-
ple, the administration stopped publishing the ethics waivers it had
granted for appointees who had engaged in lobbying activities over the
previous two years that would normally bar them from working on the
80. Id. at 311-12.
81. Id. at 313.
82. Id.
83. See Show, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 4:12-CV-429-Y, 2013 WL 11309349 (N.D. Tex.
July 29, 2013); Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (on file with author) (alleging violations of
FOIA and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a). See also Am. Farm Bur. Fed'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot Agency,
836 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding the EPA may be liable for Privacy Act violations for releas-
ing too much data about farming operations, which might be used by activists to harass the farm-
ers).
84. Andrew Bergman & Toly Rinberg, In Its first year, the Trump administration has reduced
public information online, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 4 2018), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2018/
01/04/in-its-first-year-the-trump-administratin-has-reduced-pubic-informatin-nline/
[http://permacc/WAT4-VD6L].
85. Eilperin, supra note 49.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Jason Pearson, executive director, Sustainable Purchasing Leadership Coun-
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same issue for the government88 The Trump administration also
stopped publishing the White House's visitor log, which prevents the
public from seeing who visits and when. 89
Thankfully, despite concerns that the Trump administration
would remove vast amounts of data from federal web sites,90 that has
not come to pass, as tracked by the Sunlight Foundation's Web Integri-
ty Project.91 Removing data from web sites can be time-consuming and
costly. Perhaps the Trump administration has not truly discovered this
tool yet,92 or perhaps it is deterred by widespread archiving of infor-
mation posted online by the Obama administration.93 Either way, the
potential for more widespread and intentional data mischief remains.
B. Manipulating Data
Short of removing data, the executive can try to manipulate them.
For example, the Trump transition team tried to manipulate economic
data by ordering the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) to adjust
their models to predict sustained economic growth of three to three
and a half percent-roughly twice the rate predicted by the Federal
Reserve and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).94 Ironically, after
inauguration, the Trump administration then accused the Obama ad-
ministration of trying to artificially depress previous unemployment
rates, which experts said "would require a conspiracy theory of mas-
sive proportions, involving hundreds if not thousands of people."95
88. Id.; Alex Howard, Secrecy on White House visitor logs shows Trump administration allergic
to transparency, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 14, 2017), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2017/04/14/
secrecy-on-white-house-visitor-logs-shows-trump-administration-allergic-to-transparency/
[https://perma.cc/T3PJ-GY2B].
89. Eilperin, supra note 49.
90. Clare Malone, How Trump's White House Could Mess With Government Data,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 15, 2016), https://fivethirtyeightcom/features/how-trumps-white-house-
could-mess-with-government-data/ [https://perma.cc/EBR4-TEEF]; Josh Gerstein, Fears rise of
Trump-era 'memory hole' in federal data, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.politico.com/
story/2016/12/trump-federal-data-fears-232591 [https://perma.cc/W3U8-SN3].
91. Web Integrity Project, supra note 75.
92. Vinik, supra note 52.
93. See infra Part IV.
94. Catherine Rampell, The Trump White House is already cooking the books, WASH. POST
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-trump-team-is-already-
cooking-the-books/2017/02/20/a793961e-f7b2-11e6-beOS-la38l7ac2la5_story.html [http://
perma.cc/56RK-5S4F].
95. Ben Casselman, The White House Takes Its Attacks on jobs Data To a New (And Danger-





Continuing the pattern, during the debate to repeal the Affordable Care
Act (ACA), the Trump administration attacked the credibility and accu-
racy of the non-partisan CBO in an unprecedented effort to pass the bill
before the CBO was able to "score" it (forecast its budgetary impact.96
The executive also has significant power to manipulate data by
deciding how to collect it, and indeed whether to collect it in the first
place. For example, in March 2017, the Trump administration reversed
a Census Bureau proposal that may have led to additional questions on
the U.S. census regarding gender identity and sexual orientation for the
first time ever-a longtime goal for LGBTQ advocates.97 The decennial
census, required by the Constitution,98 is used not only to apportion
the House of Representatives, but to set statistical baselines that in-
form countless policy decisions.99 For example, census data are essen-
tial for enforcing equality-enhancing laws. The Census Bureau itself
explains that "laws promoting equal employment opportunity for
women require census data on sex." 100
In that spirit, LGBTQ groups hoped that better census data about
their communities could help reduce discrimination and improve ac-
cess to and the operation of government programs.101 Instead, the Cen-
sus Bureau's brief hint that it was considering adding gender identity
and sexual orientation questions to the census questionnaire quickly
disappeared.02 Around the same time, the Trump administration re-
moved questions about gender identity and sexual orientation from
two surveys sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS).103 Leah Litman and Helen Klein Murillo called the
96. Ben Casselman et al., TrumpBeat: How to Judge Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trumpbeat-how-to-judge-trump/ [https://perma.cc/XG3V-
8B7F].
97. Chris Johnson, Trump's U.S. Census proposes, immediately cuts LGBT survey questions,
WASH. BLADE (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/03/28/u-s-census-
proposes-immediately-cuts-lgbt-questions/ [https://perma.cc/7LMY-DD66]; Litman & Murillo,
supra note 13; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUBJECTS PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS
AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2017), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/
decennial/2020/operations/planned-subjects-2020-acs.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z47S-WGK9].
98. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
99. Litman & Murillo, supra note 13.
100. U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census: Explore the Form, CENSUS.GOV, https://
www.census.gov/2010census/about/interactive-form.php [https://perma.cc/7KX8-UEPE];
Litman & Murillo, supra note 13.
101. Johnson, supra note 97.
102. Ben Casselman, Why Won't the Census Ask About Sexual Orientation?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-wont-the-census-ask-about-sexual-
orientation/ [https;//perma.cc/YN4G-YWU9].
103. Id. (The surveys are the National Survey of Older Americans Act Participants and the
Annual Program Performance Report for the Centers for Independent Living.).
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moves "nothing less than a war on information" and an effort "to deny
the existence of problems by disappearing the facts,"104 noting that
openness and visibility are core to many LGBTQ rights. 105
More fundamentally, observers are suspicious that the Trump
administration is trying to undermine the 2020 census by requesting
$135 million less for the Census Bureau than the agency requested the
previous year.106 Again, such actions raise suspicions that the admin-
istration is undermining essential data collection in order to manipu-
late the statistical picture.
C. Censoring Climate Science
A separate category of data manipulation occurs when the execu-
tive tries to censor science. And the Trump administration has been
particularly antagonistic towards scientific evidence of climate change.
President Trump is a longstanding climate change denier.107 Shortly
after inauguration, his administration scrubbed references to "climate
change" on various federal web sites and made it harder to access cli-
mate data from agencies like the EPA and the Department of the Inte-
rior. For example, days after taking office, the Trump administration
scrubbed from the EPA's web site many uses of the terms "fossil fuels,"
"greenhouse gases," "global warming," and even, remarkably, the word
"science."108 A comparison showed that the old EPA.gov web site in-
cluded the term "climate change" on more than 12,000 pages; after
edits by the Trump administration, it appears on just over 5,000 pag-
es. 109 Likewise, in April 2017, after the EPA had published an "update"
to its web site, observers noticed that the agency had removed a vast
section on "Climate Change" that had existed in some form since 1997,
104. Litman & Murillo, supra note 13.
105. Id.
106. Trump Administration Budget Update, CENSUS PROJECT, https://thecensusprojectorg/
updates/trump-administration-budget-update/ [https://perma.cc/T6ZU-VHQA].
107. Michael Finnegan, Hoax Con job. Chinese Plot Trump tweets have bashed climate science
for years, LA. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-dimate-
tweets-20170328-story.html [http://permacc/DC75-GKJZ] (showing tweets where Trump called
climate change a "hoax" and twice called it "bullshit").
108. Laignee Barron, Here's What the EPA's Website Looks Like After a Year of Climate Change





including important scientific background on human contributions to
climate change.110
These moves were a significant departure from the usual types of
changes made by incoming administrations."' Instead of editing web
sites for appearance and presentation, or to reflect shifting policy pri-
orities, the edits were seen as "an unprecedented attempt to delete or
bury credible scientific information" that might be "politically incon-
venient"112 An anonymous source explained that EPA Administrator
Scott Pruitt approved the web site changes to bring it in line with
Trump administration policies and avoid open contradictions.113 But as
one observer quipped, "It's hard to understand why facts require revi-
sion."114 This is not particularly new, of course. When George W. Bush
took office, his administration froze updates to the EPA web site pend-
ing White House review.115 And there were allegations that his admin-
istration both distorted and suppressed certain climate change
research.116 However, those changes did not target "scientific con-
tent"117
The Trump administration also has taken more formal actions to
undermine climate science. In 2013, President Obama published an
executive order directing several agencies-the Department of De-
fense, EPA, HHS, and the Department of Homeland Security-to "work
together to develop and provide authoritative, easily accessible, usable,
and timely data ... on climate preparedness and resilience."118 Howev-
er, in March 2017, the Trump administration issued its own order re-
yoking the Obama executive order and other prior presidential actions
110. Id. Many links in the 'Climate Change" subdomain are still accessible but are no longer
organized or easy to locate. Chris Mooney & Juliet Eilperin, EPA website removes climate science




111. Barron, supra note 108 (quoting Heather Zichal, senior fellow, Atlantic Council's Global
Energy Center).
112. Id.
113. Mooney & Eilperin, supra note 110.
114. Id. (quoting Katherine Hayhoe, a climate scientist at Texas Tech University).
115. Id.
116. Allegations of Political Interference with Government Climate Change Science: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 198 (2007); Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 55 (2007); CHRIS
MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005).
117. Mooney & Eilperin,supra note 110.
118. Exec. Order No. 13,653 (Nov. 1, 2013).
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calling for climate data collection and sharing.119 It also formally re-
scinded two prior climate change reports issued by President
Obama.120
Still, in a surprising act of transparency from the Trump EPA, the
agency posted an exact replica of the EPA.gov web site as it existed on
January 19, 2017, President Obama's last day in office.121 Some, in fact,
speculated that the link was an act of rebellion by EPA career staff or
may have been a response to a flood of FOIA requests for the materi-
als.122
Nevertheless, the Trump administration's censorship of climate
science reached even public appearances by staff. In 2017, the EPA
barred two agency scientists and a contractor from presenting at a
conference addressing climate change.123 When the move sparked out-
rage-and a letter from Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.)-EPA Ad-
ministrator Scott Pruitt promised that new procedures would prevent
a recurrence.124 Likewise, despite concerns to the contrary, the Trump
administration did publish the legally-mandated National Climate As-
sessment, which states clearly that climate change is driven almost
entirely by human influence, a sharp contradiction from the Trump
administration's positions.125
Still, efforts to censor climate science are troubling, not only due
to increasingly dire reports on both the pace and severity of climate
change,126 but because censoring underlying data precludes informed
119. Exec. Order No. 13,783 (Mar. 28,2017).
120. Id. (rescinding the Report of the Executive Office of the President of June 2013 (The
President's Climate Action Plan) and the Report of the Executive Office of the President of March
2014 (Climate Action Plan Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions)).
121. Vinik, supra note 52.
122. Id.
123. Lisa Friedman, EPA Cancels Talk on Climate Change by Agency Scientists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct
22, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/climate/epa-scientists.html [https://
perma.cc/GR28-WUAZ].
124. Lisa Friedman, Scott Pruitt; EPA Chief Says Agency Scientists Are Free to Discuss Their
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/climate/scott-pruitt-
epa.html [https://perma.cc/24HS-PUKU].
125. Brady Dennis et al., Trump administration releases report finding 'no convincing alterna-
tive explanation' for climate change, WASH. PosT (Nov. 3, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpostcom/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/03/trump-administration-
releases-report-finds-no-convincing-alternative-explanation-for-climate-change/
?utmterm=.7faf02f38048 [https://perma.cc/7CZV-8RJG]. For the full report, see U.S. GLOB.
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT,
VOLUME I (2017), https://science2Ol7.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017-FullReportpdf
[https://perma.cc/8L3-DBKL].
126. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.50 C: SUMMARY FOR




policymaking. As Murillo and Litman argue, "Burying information
doesn't get us to reasoned policy; instead, it subverts public debate." 127
D. Scrubbing Terminology
In addition to scrubbing "climate change" from various federal
web sites, the Trump administration has rendered other terms taboo.
In late 2017, federal agencies were advised to avoid using certain
words in their budget requests.128 For example, HHS officials distribut-
ed a one-page "style guide" instructing budget officials at various sub-
agencies (the CDC, NIH, and FDA) to avoid using the words "vulnera-
ble," "diversity," and "entitlement."129 Similarly, officials at a budget
meeting advised federal employees to avoid the phrases "evidence-
based" and "science-based," drawing fierce criticism from Senate Dem-
ocrats and public health organizations.130
Likewise, the Trump administration scrubbed several instances of
the word "gender" from the HHS Office of Civil Rights web site titled
"Discrimination on the Basis of Sex,"131 perhaps foreshadowing an ef-
fort to define "gender" more narrowly in order to remove federal pro-
tections for transgender populations.132
Again, every new administration brings with it a shift in policy
priorities. And every new administration engages not only in selective
messaging, but emphasizes some information rather than others. But eras-
ing certain terminology from official documents is a particularly cyni-
cal use of the federal executive's information platform.
E. Weaponizing Transparency
A final class of information mischief includes the Trump admin-
istration using transparency as a weapon or pretext to achieve other
127. Murillo & Litman, supra note 55.
128. Juliet Eliperin & Lena H. Sun, As Trump administration targets certain words, 'a hostile





131. RACHEL BERGMAN, REMOVAL OF MENTIONS OF THE TERM "GENDER" FROM HHS's OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS "DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX" WEBPAGE (2018), http://sunlightfoundation.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/MR-2-HHS-OCR-Removal-of-Gender-Mentions-181022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN8N-S72S].
132. Erica L Green et al., Transgender" Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump Admin-
istration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/
transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html [https://perma.cc/2YTU-CXDZ].
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ends. The most significant action here is the EPA's so-called "secret
science" rule. In April 2018, the EPA proposed a rule that would pro-
hibit the agency from issuing rules based on studies that use non-
public data.133 Under the guise of promoting transparency and coun-
tering so-called "secret science," the rule would require EPA to "clearly
identify all studies (or other regulatory science) relied upon when it
takes any final agency action."134 For example, the EPA would have to
"ensure that dose response data and models underlying pivotal regula-
tory science are publicly available in a manner sufficient for independ-
ent validation." 135
The proposal assumes that scientific validity depends on data
transparency, a notion that might sound obviously correct to lay audi-
ences. 136 But the lodestar of scientific validity is study design, repro-
ducibility, and peer-review, not necessarily data transparency. Of
course, data transparency is a laudable goal. Agencies have long been
encouraged to disclose research study data "to the extent practicable
and permitted by law."137 But for the "secret science" rule, transparen-
cy is mere pretext. Other federal laws dictate that privacy, trade se-
crets, and other types of confidential information should remain so.138
And, contrary to assertions by some EPA officials, promises to "de-
identify" personal information in order to make data sets public are
often empty gestures, as subjects are relatively easy to "re-identify."139
Importantly, the proposed "secret science" rule runs afoul of deci-
sions by the D.C. Circuit, which has rejected previous challenges to EPA
rules arguing that the agency did not disclose the underlying data that
formed the basis for the rule.140 The D.C. Circuit noted in those cases
that data disclosure can be "impracticable and unnecessary" and would
result in the agency disregarding "much plainly relevant scientific in-
formation."141
133. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768 (Apr. 30,2018).
134. Id. at 18,773.
135. Id. (emphasis from original removed).
136. Albert C. Lin, President Trump's War on Regulatory Science, 43 HARv. ENVTL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 6), http://ssrn.com/abstract=-3248058 [https://perma.cc/
C9BH-694A].
137. Adoption of Recommendations, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,352, 41,358 (July 10, 2013).
138. Id. at41,358 n.12.
139. Joel Schwartz, 'Transparency" as Mask? The EPA's Proposed Rule on Scientific Data,
379 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1496,1496-97 (2018).
140. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Coalition of Battery
Recyclers Ass'n v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
141. Am. TruckingAss'ns, 283 F.3d at 372.
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The pretext behind the EPA's "secret science" proposal is apparent
when viewed together with an effort to exclude from the EPA's scien-
tific advisory panels, "academic scientists who receive research grants
from the agency," only to be replaced by "industry-funded scien-
tists."142 Taken in tandem, some find it "difficult not to conclude that
the real purpose of the proposal is to eliminate a vast body of highly
relevant data from consideration, resulting in a weakening of stand-
ards that are no longer supported by 'sufficient scientific evidence,"' an
approach used by tobacco companies to fight off regulation in the
1990S.143
Weaponized transparency has also found traction in Congress,
where the House passed the Honest and Open EPA Science Treatment
(HONEST) Act of 2017.14 Like the EPA's proposed rule, the HONEST
Act would prohibit the agency from using studies to make decisions
"unless raw data, computer codes, and virtually everything used by
scientists to conduct the study are provided to the agency and made
publicly available online."145 The scientific community was quick to see
the bill for what it was: "an attempt by politicians to override scientific
judgment and dictate narrow standards by which science is deemed
valuable for policy."146 The HONEST Act is not the effort's first itera-
tion. In 2015, Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX), himself a climate change deni-
er,147 sponsored the Secret Science Reform Act, which would have
operated substantially the same way.148 Although neither bill passed
the Senate, the idea found a vehicle in the Trump administration's EPA,
where the proposed rule is currently pending after receiving public
comments. 149
142. Schwartz, supra note 139, at 1496.
143. Id. at 1497.
144. H.R. 1430,115th Cong. (2017).
145. David Michaels & Thomas Burke, The Dishonest HONEST Act, 356 SCIENCE 989, 989
(2017).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Lisa Rein, Meet the House science chairman who's trying to put global warming
research on ice, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpostcom/news/federal-
eye/wp/2015/12/22/meet-the-house-science-committee-chairman-whos-trying-to-put-global-
warming-research-on-ice/ [https://perma.cc/PR9F-Q7DP]; Jeffrey Mervis, Lamar Smith, unbound,
lays out political strategy at climate doubters' conference, So. MAG. (Mar. 24, 2017), http://
wwws.ciencemag.org/news/2017/03/lamar-smith-unbound-lays-out-political-strategy-climate-
doubters-conference [https://perma.cc/TVF7-ZVMA].
148. H.R. 1030, 114th Cong. (2015).
149. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768 (Apr. 30, 2018)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 30).
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Transparency has also been used as a cudgel against political op-
ponents. In January 2018, the Trump administration agreed to selec-
tively declassify a controversial memorandum prepared by
Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee that was critical of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and its investigation of Rus-
sian interference in the 2016 presidential election.s0 The move was
seen as an attempt to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the investiga-
tion.lslThe House committee released the memo by invoking House
rules, never before used, that allow the committee to publish classified
information if it serves the public interest, and after notice and an op-
portunity for objection by the President.152 But the refusal to also dis-
close a counterpoint memo prepared by Democrats on the committee
raised allegations of "selective declassification" and "weaponized dis-
closure."153
The Trump administration has also used selective disclosure to
target immigrants. Through two executive orders, the Trump admin-
istration directed agencies to collect and publish data highlighting
crimes committed by immigrants. The first order in January 2017, in a
section titled "Transparency," directed the Attorney General and De-
partment of Homeland Security to gather data on the "immigrant sta-
tus of all [incarcerated] aliens."154 The second order in March 2017,
under a section titled "Transparency and Data Collection," directed the
Attorney General and Department of Homeland Security to publish
data on the number of foreign nationals in the United States that have
been radicalized or were charged with terrorism-related crimes.1ss A
group of open government advocacy organizations objected that publi-
cation of such information would violate federal privacy laws and in-
150. Devlin Barrett et al., Release of disputed GOP memo on FBI surveillance unleashes waves of
recrimination, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/president-apprves-reease-of-gop-memo-criticizing-fbi-surveillance/2018/02/02/
699eb988-06cf-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5 story.html [http://perma.cc/8GDE-XWUT].
151. Tracking the Trump Administration's Record on Transparency, SUNLIGHT FOUND., https://
sunlightfoundation.com/tracidng-trumps-attacks-on-transparency/ [http://perma.cc/MEM6-
D4BY].
152. H.R. RULE X § 11(g)(1), 114th Cong. (2015).
153. What Trump's release of the memo tells us about transparency in D.C., SUNLIGHT FOUND.
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2018/02/02/what-trumps-release-of-the-memo-
tells-us-about-transparency-in-dc/ [http://perma.cc/2PPD-BNBX]; Steven Aftergood, Bad Faith
at the House Intelligence Committee, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS Gan. 30, 2018), https://fas.org/blogs/
secrecy/2018/01/hpsc-bad-faith/ [https://perma.cc/3FWM-KNTZ].




formation quality guidelines.156 In fact, the letter objected that the or-
ders would disclose sensitive information about immigrants who are
not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, removing Privacy Act
protections for those populations, in reversal of policy followed by
both the Obama and George W. Bush administrations.157 The Sunlight
Foundation called the selective disclosures "a tool for division and pub-
lic intimidation, rather than a means for achieving transparency and
accountability," emphasizing that "[iln the 21st century, information
disclosures hold immense potential to harm individuals when govern-
ment use public data irresponsibly."158
IV. WHAT CONSTRAINS INFORMATION MISCHIEF?
Given the federal executive's wide discretion, what if anything can
constrain information mischief? Some constraints are legal in nature:
various statutes require the executive to gather certain information,
publish it, or present it a certain way. However, the scope of these laws
is limited, and they still leave significant room for executive discretion.
Non-legal constraints exist in the form of internal agency policies,
norms, and practical constraints, such as third-party archiving and
monitoring, that might help deter information mischief. Articulating an
epistemology for executive information requires understanding both
the legal and non-legal constraints. But the question remains-are
these constraints meaningful?
A Legal Constraints
Various statutes specify the information agencies must collect and
whether (and how) they publish it. Here, I examine the extent to which
they provide meaningful constraints on executive discretion.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 552 of the APA
requires agencies to publish in the Federal Register information re-
garding their internal organization and functions, as well as rules of
156. Letter from Lisa Rosenberg of OpenTheGovernment to Hon. John F. Kelly, Sec'y of Home-
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procedure, substantive rules, interpretive rules, and policy state-
ments.15 9 It also requires agencies to post in electronic format all final
opinions and orders, any policy statements not in the Federal Register,
internal agency manuals that affect the public, and documents fre-
quently requested under FOIA.160 Section 552(b) includes various ex-
emptions from these requirements,161 although section 552(d) clarifies
that nothing in that section authorizes agencies to withhold records
from the public or from Congress.162
Section 552 also creates an Office of Government Information Ser-
vices within the National Archives and Records Administration, and
charges it with reviewing agency compliance with FOIA and mediating
disputes with requesters.63 Likewise, it directs the GAO to audit agen-
cy performance under FOIA and publish its findings,164 and calls for
each agency to designate a Chief FOIA Officer.165 Thus, the APA creates
a relatively well-defined system for agencies to satisfy their FOIA obli-
gations.
Otherwise, the APA leaves the vast majority of agency information
practices unspecified. Press releases, social media posts, web site publica-
tion, and database practices exist largely outside the APA. Moreover, the
APA's judicial review provisions do not provide much grounds to chal-
lenge the vast majority of agency information activities. Although the
APA authorizes judicial review of "final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in a court," 166 it is very unlikely that most
information activities would constitute final agency action. For exam-
ple, an analysis of the Trump administration's "war on regulatory sci-
ence" finds that its efforts "are governed only loosely by law or may
escape judicial review completely."167 Likewise, my previous research
found that when agencies publish information adverse to regulated
parties, their actions are largely not reviewable under the APA.168
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Although the FTCA authorizes
certain suits against the federal government, it specifically excludes
159. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012).
160. Id. § 552(a)(2).
161. Id. § 552(b).
162. Id. § 552(d).
163. Id. § 552(h).
164. Id. § 552(i).
165. Id. § 552Ck).
166. Id. § 704.
167. Lin, supra note 136 (manuscript at 46).




libel, slander, and other statements that might qualify as intentional
torts.169 Thus, the damaging agency press release or misleading enforce-
ment report probably would not give rise to damages under the FTCA.
Similarly, the FTCA includes a broad exemption for discretionary func-
tions, which courts have read as including the release of information
and even the underlying data supporting the communication.170 Thus,
as James O'Reilly has observed, "the consistent view of courts, com-
mentators, and career FTCA defenders is that any intentionally-caused
federal agency disclosure, which causes a reputational injury, is not
actionable under the FTCA."171
The Information Quality Act (IQA). The Information Quality Act of
2001, sometimes called the Data Quality Act (DQA),172 required the
OMB to issue guidelines for federal agencies for "ensuring and maxim-
izing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of infor-
mation.., disseminated by the government."173 Although some see the
Act as somewhat anti-regulatory in nature, 174 it can be used to enhance
trust in government information. In particular, the Act includes proce-
dural features that "allow[] affected persons to seek and obtain correc-
tion of information maintained and disseminated by the agency."'75
The IQA is broad but probably underutilized. It applies to agency
"dissemination of public information, regardless of the form or for-
mat"176 Moreover, OMB guidelines define "information" as "any com-
munication or representation of knowledge such as facts or data, in
any medium or form."177 However, as noted above, the definition ex-
cludes "opinions, where the agency's presentation makes it clear that •
what is being offered is someone's opinion rather than fact or the
169. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012); Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the
Internet Era, supra note 10, at 1448.
170. See, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 125-26 (1997); Fisher Bros.
Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d
833,837-38 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
171. O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 522. Likewise, my research finds that procedural due process,
First Amendment, and Takings Clause claims also routinely fail. See Cortez, Adverse Publicity by
Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, supra note 10, at 1449-50.
172. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001); 44 U.S.C. § 3516 (2012).
173. 44 U.S.C. § 3516. The Information Quality Act builds on requirements from the Paper-
work Reduction Act regarding information dissemination. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 3504, 109 Stat. 1.63, 168 (1995).
174. Karen E.C. Levy & David Merritt Johns, When Open Data Is a Trojan Horse: The Weapon-
ization of Transparency in Science and Governance, BIG DATA & Soc'Y, Jan.-June 2016, at 1, 1.
175. Id.
176. 44 U.S.C. § 3504(d)(1) (2012).
177. 67 Fed. Reg. 8451, 8458-59 (Feb. 22, 2002).
2019]
CH7CA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
agency's views."178 Another limitation of the IQA is that it does not
create judicially enforceable rights,179 although some continue to argue
otherwise.180 Thus, most agree that parties cannot sue if an agency
violates its own information quality guidelines or rejects a request to
correct or retract information published by the agency. 181
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The Paperwork Reduction Act al-
so creates a framework that establishes federal agencies as stewards of
federal information and data.182 For example, it requires the head of
each agency to manage agency information resources,183 with a stated
goal of "provid[ing] for the dissemination of public information on a
timely basis, on equitable terms, and in a manner that promotes the
utility of the information to the public."184 Likewise, the PRA requires
each agency to "improve the integrity, quality, and utility of infor-
mation to all users within and outside the agency, including capabili-
ties for ensuring dissemination of public information, public access to
government information, and protections for privacy and security."18s
In this vein, the PRA centralizes information collection requests (ICRs)
by agencies, requiring prior OMB approval.186 Notably, however, the
PRA does not create a private right of action.187
Best Available Data Statutes. Some, but not many, statutes require
agencies to base their decisions on the "best available science."188 For
example, the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, and the Magnuson-Stevenson Act all contain some version of the
requirement, 8 9 as do environmental statutes, such as the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act and the Safe Water Drinking Act. 190 The latter two
might create problems for the Trump administration's "secret science"
178. 67 Fed. Reg. 369, 377 (Feb. 22, 2002).
179. CORTEZ, supra note 11, at 29 n.216.
180. See, e.g., Dan Davidson, Nixon's 'Nerd' Turns Regulations Watchdog, FED. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2002), http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20021111-fedtimes-tozzi.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK8C-
A66D].
181. CORTEZ, supra note 11, at 29 n.216 (citing cases).
182. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2012).
183. Id. § 3506(a)(1)(A).
184. Id. § 3501(7).
185. Id. § 3506(b)(1)(C).
186. Id. § 3507.
187. Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1129 (S.D. Tex, 2002); Alegent Health-Immanuel Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius,
34 F. Supp. 3d 160, 170 (D.D.C. 2014).
188. Lin, supra note 136 (manuscript at 25 n.142).
189. Id.; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A), 1536(a)(2), 1371(a)(3)(A), 1851(a)(2) (2012).
190. I5 U.S.c. § 2625(h) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A) (2012).
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rule191 if it requires the EPA to ignore peer-reviewed and validated
studies merely because they rely on non-public data.192 Moreover, ex-
tensive edits to the EPA's web site shortly after Trump was inaugurat-
ed in 2017 were seen as potentially violating the "best available
science" mandates.193 Nevertheless, these statutes obviously are limited
by their terms to specific agencies in specific contexts.
The Whistleblower Protection Act Finally, the Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act might protect agency employees who disclose information
that they reasonably believe demonstrates a violation of law or regula-
tion, or amounts to a "gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health
or safety."194 Congress amended the Act in 2012 to protect disclosures
concerning "censorship related to research, analysis, or technical in-
formation," meaning "any effort to distort, misrepresent, or suppress
research, analysis, or technical information."195 Indeed, the 2017 gag
order issued by HHS-barring employees from making public state-
ments and requiring notice to the agency before communicating with
Congress-may have violated provisions in the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act covering agency nondisclosure policies.196 Likewise, after em-
ployees at four agencies were instructed to stop external
communications while the Trump administration could fill top agency
positions,197 Republicans in Congress sent a letter to President
Trump's White House counsel emphasizing that whistleblower protec-
tions are a key feature of accountable government.198 Still, it can be
191. See supra Section III.E.
192. Lin, supra note 136 (manuscript at 27).
193. Barron, supra note 108.
194. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012).
195. Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 110(a)(3), (b)(1), 126 Stat. 1472
(2012).
196. Lin, supra note 136 (manuscript at 45); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(13); Pamela Wolf, Republican
lawmakers warn HHS secretary that memo may violate whistleblower protections, EMP. L. DAILY
(May 10, 2017), http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2017/05/1O/republican-
lawmakers-warn-hhs-secretary-that-memo-may-violate-whistleblower-protections/ [https://
perma.cc/RS39-R2N2].
197. Coral Davenport, Federal Agencies Told to Halt External Communications, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/some-agencies-told-to-halt-
communicat-ions-as-trump-administration-moves-in.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZZ-CHDR].
198. Letter from Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Hon. Mark Meadows, and Hon. Charles E. Grassley to
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daunting for agency employees to pursue claims under the Act, and
claims do not often succeed.199
Thus, a variety of statutes constrain executive discretion over in-
formation, though all are quite limited in scope and application.200
Even together, they fail to reach much of the information mischief of
the Trump administration.
Judicial review as a deterrent. Finally, as a non-statutory legal con-
straint, perhaps agencies can be deterred from information mischief if
they worry it will subvert proposed rules, orders, or other agency ac-
tions? For example, cases like State Farm direct courts to provide "hard
look" review of agency rules, which allows courts to consider the entire
record of evidence to determine if the rule is arbitrary and capri-
cious.201 If the agency's record can be undermined by evidence of in-
formation mischief, it might invite courts to invalidate the agency's
efforts-or at least trigger more searching review.202 Indeed, there
may be hints that the Trump administration's removal of public data
has weakened the administration's credibility in court. For example,
before the Trump administration, courts rarely demanded that agen-
cies consider the effects that new pipelines and other energy transport
projects would have on greenhouse gas emissions. But since the Trump
administration's withdrawal of government studies on the social cost
of carbon, courts have begun demanding that the administration con-
sider greenhouse gases when it approves these projects.203 A record of
199. Whistleblower Protection Since Passage of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement
Act: Hearing Before the H. Oversight & Gov't Reform Com., Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, US. Postal
Serv. & the Census, 114th Cong. 8-13 (2017) (statement of Thomas Devine, Government Account-
ability Project).
200. Likewise, constitutional protections like the First Amendment are not helpful. The First
Amendment "restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). Thus, the First Amendment
does not prevent agencies from publishing false or misleading information. Lin, supra note 136
(manuscript at 40). Moreover, agency employees speaking in their official capacities do not speak
as citizens and thus the First Amendment does not protect them from employee discipline for
their speech. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). Of course, the line between citizen and
agency employee is not always clear. Id. at 420-21, 424-25.
201. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
202. See, e.g., Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Should Judges Pay Attention to Trump's Tweets?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 4, 2019), https://fivethirtyeightcom/features/should-judges-pay-
attention-to-trumps-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/E4CN-7TSG].
203. See James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of
Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REv. 119, 128-29, 152 (2018) (explaining that, until
recently, courts have not required such studies but recently courts and one FERC commissioner
have decided they are now necessary); Amanda Reilly, Trump killed Obama carbon reviews, but
courts still want them, E&E NEWS (Sept 1, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1060059539 [https://perma.cc/9F62-YPS9] (explaining how courts have become more aggres-
sive in response to President Trump's efforts to rescind government studies).
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information mischief might reverse, or at least weaken, the usual pre-
sumptions of good faith or normality that agencies often enjoy.
B. Non-Legal Constraints
If statutes leave many important executive information activities
untouched, do non-legal mechanisms impose meaningful constraints?
Here I examine the extent to which internal agency policies, norms,
and practical constraints, such as third-party archiving and monitor-
ing, might help deter information mischief.
First, agencies have adopted a variety of internal structures, poli-
cies, and procedures that govern their information practices and thus
might constrain their discretion to various degrees.204 As noted above,
agencies have adopted policies governing scientific integrity, FOIA
disclosures, data quality, and many more. Such policies can serve as
pre-commitment devices, particularly when made public. Much of the
action here occurs, of course, within agencies and thus constitutes
what Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack call "internal administrative
law."205 These internal machineries generally are not subject to judicial
review because they do not constitute "final" agency action, do not give
rise to justiciable claims, or involve internal personnel and manage-
ment prerogatives.06 When viewed in this frame, the Obama admin-
istration's open government directives signal precisely the kind of
"rule-of-law values, including transparency, argumentation, and con-
sistency," that Metzger and Stack call for in the absence of external
judicial review. 207 For example, agency scientific integrity policies
qualify as internal guidance and do not, therefore, create enforceable
legal obligations.208 Nevertheless, agencies such as the EPA now have a
"Scientific Integrity Official" and use mechanisms such as a "Scientific
Integrity Review Panel" to investigate violations of these policies.209
Even though the policies are not subject to judicial review, they can
enhance agency decisionmaking and deter information mischief.
Second, a close relative to internal agency policies and procedures
is agency norms. Though not traditionally binding or enforceable,
204. For an analysis of various forms of policies and how agencies comply with them, see
CORTEZ, supra note 11, at 30-72 (evaluating the CFPB, FTC, and FDA).
205. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L REV. 1239,
1251,1264 (2017).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1297.
208. EPA SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY, supra note 26, at 2.
209. Id. at 10; EPA SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY DETERMINATION, supra note 25.
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norms can reinforce institutional legitimacy. Norms represent infor-
mal, extralegal "rules" and expectations for behavior,210 typically en-
forced in non-legal ways. 211 Norms of openness and disclosure have
been built over the last two decades with increasing government use of
the Internet.212 Likewise, norms of vigorously defending FOIA suits also
pass from one administration to the next. Unfortunately, many longstand-
ing government norms have been disregarded by the Trump admin-
istration.213 Norms themselves can be powerful constraints on
behavior, but are at risk of eroding if not observed.
A final constraint on information mischief is practical. Non-
government parties, motivated by fears that the Trump administration
might remove or manipulate data, are closely monitoring federal web
sites and have engaged in large-scale archiving. These collective efforts
to make the data available elsewhere might deter agencies from trying
to remove or manipulate data. After the November 2016 election, a
variety of private and non-profit groups sprang into action to save pub-
lic data sets,214 a move called "guerilla archiving."215 For example, re-
searchers from the University of Pennsylvania and the University of
North Texas organized efforts to archive federal web pages before
Trump was inaugurated.216 Likewise, legal scholar Paul Gowder creat-
ed a Python script to monitor public data and track deletions or modi-
fications.217 Similarly, after the Trump administration removed from
the EPA and Interior Department web sites documents discussing how
climate change might affect desert ecology in the southwest, the City of
Chicago posted the same documents archived during the Obama ad-
210. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article 1, 131 HARV. L. REv. 2187, 2196 (2018).
211. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 350 (1997).
212. Seesupra Part II.
213. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 136. For example, the Sunlight Foundation noted how Donald
Trump was "the least transparent modern candidate in modern history" because he "held no
press conference.., from July 2016 until January 11, 2017, released no tax returns, and made no
proactive disclosures around transition or inauguration." Tracking the Trump Administration's
Record on Transparency, supra note 151.
214. Megan Molteni, Diehard Coders just Saved NASA's Earth Science Data, WIRED (Feb. 13,
2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/diehard-coders-just-saved-nasas-earth-science-data/
[https://perma.cc/Q3VH-9HW6]; Zoe Schlanger, Rogue Scientists Race to Save Climate Data From
Trump, WIRED (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/rogue-scientists-race-save-
climate-data-trump/ [https://perma.cc/G44W-4BG].
215. Vinlk,supra note 52.
216. Id.




ministration.218 The Environmental Data and Governance Initiative
(EDGI) has tracked 25,000 web pages since Trump was inaugurated.219
Even agencies themselves prepared for the worst in December 2016,
the FDA engaged in a "data dump," making available for the first time
data on adverse events related to food products and cosmetics.220
Perhaps the most comprehensive and concerted counter-
measures are being taken by the Sunlight Foundation. Its "Dark Data"
initiative asks web site users to "Help keep track of open data sets re-
moved from federal web sites."221 Although the Sunlight Foundation
has not found widespread removal of data sets yet, as many have
feared, it remains vigilant given how "secretive" the Trump administra-
tion has been.222 According to the Sunlight Foundation, the Trump ad-
ministration has "one of the worst records on open government in the
first 100 days of any administration in American history."223
Thus, third party archivists and monitors can help deter, or at
least shine a light on, acts of information mischief. Indeed, their efforts
were mirrored by a bill in Congress to preserve federal data. In April
2017, senators Gary Peters (D-MI) and Cory Gardner (R-CO) intro-
duced the Preserving Government Data Act of 2017 to make it more
218. Eflperin, supra note 49.
219. Barron, supra note 108; Website Monitoring, EDGI, https://envirodatagov.org/website-
monitoring/ [https://perma.cc/YTQS-B8D6].
220. Susan Mayne & Katherine Vierk Why FDA Is Making Data Extracted from Reports of
Adverse Events for Foods and Cosmetics Available to the Public, HEALTHDATA.GOV (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://healthdata.gov/blog/why-fda-making-data-extracted-reports-adverse-events-foods-and-
cosmeticsavailable-public [https://permacc/9LKN-42B8]. Note that the original link to this story
on the FDA's own web site no longer directs to this information (https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/
index.php/2016/12/why-fda-is-making-data-extracted-from-reports-of-adverse-events-for-
foods-and-cosmetics-available-to-the-public/ [https://perma.cc/CCD6-L3YV]). Another consider-
ation is that removal of data can thwart agency-to-agency communications, as well as de-
regulatory initiatives. For example, removal of enforcement records and data can make it harder
for the White House or trade groups to understand which laws are imposing the greatest costs on
industry. See, eg., James W. Coleman, How Cheap is Corporate Talk? Comparing Companies' Com-
ments on Regulations with Their Securities Disclosures, 40 HARv. ENVrL L REv. 47, 79 n.137 (2016)
(describing inter-agency cooperation between SEC and FDA "to ensure drug manufacturers are
not misleading investors about their prospects of regulatory approval"). See also id. at 76-80
(describing how EPA and SEC could also coordinate on industry statements about environmental
regulation).
221. Web Integrity Project, supra note 75.
222. Bergman & Rinberg supra note 84.
223. Id.; Sunlight joins C-SPAN to make sense of the state of open government SUNLIGHT FOUND.
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2017/03/15/sunlight-joins-c-span-to-make-
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difficult to delete publicly available data.224 Some have critiqued the
bill as too broad,225 though it has little chance of passing during this
administration.
CONCLUSION
Since taking office, the Trump administration not only has re-
treated from a number of open government practices established by
predecessors, but has engaged in a variety of mischievous information
activities, such as removing and manipulating data, scrubbing disfa-
vored terms from federal web sites, and even using transparency as a
pretext to selectively disclose information for more cynical purposes.
This Article is a first attempt to log and evaluate the early record of the
Trump administration. It is unclear the extent to which legal and non-
legal tools can provide meaningful constraints on an executive inter-
ested in exploiting its power over information. The most powerful tool
may be to fight information with information, drawing attention to
these practices and archiving important information.
224. S. 960, 115th Cong. (2017).
225. New bill would preserve public access to public data online, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 27,
2017), https://sunightfoundatiocom/2017/4/27/ne-biu-would-preserve-pubic-access-to-
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harder to delete government data, ENGADGET (May 2, 2017), https://www.engadgetcom/2017/
05/02/bill-preserving-government-data-act-2017/ [http://perma.cc/3SY-S3R7].
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